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The  paper  aims  to  describe  the  contribution  of  four  Harvard  economists  to  the 
interpretation of the Great Depression and the policy decision making from 1933 to 1938. 
Lauchlin B. Currie, Jacob Viner, John H. Williams, Harry D. White, eminent scholars in the 
field of monetary and international economics, were deeply involved in policy decisions 
during the New Deal. In our synoptic analysis we will benefit from extensive scholarly 
work  that  has  been  provided  in  the  last  few  years.  We  shall  examine  the  extensive 
biographical connection between Currie, Viner, White and Williams with special regard to 
their common  training  at Harvard. Then we  shall  compare  their  interpretations of  the 
causes of crisis and their proposals in fiscal, monetary and banking policy. Finally, we 
shall describe their advisory activity in the Roosevelt administration and try to assess 
their influence. 
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When  studying  the  causes  of  the  Great  Depression,  the  so-called  Chicago 
School of Political Economy has traditionally been looked at as a key reference 
point. In the past few years, however, further studies have highlighted important 
contributions coming from different intellectual environments, especially Harvard 
(see, for example, Laidler and Sandilands (2002 [2003]). In particular, the four 
Harvard economists Jacob Viner, John H. Williams, Lauchlin B. Currie, and Harry 
D.  White,  have  been  studied  for  their  close  connections  with  the  New  Deal 
Administration and for offering a very innovative analysis of the Depression. 
While  the  life  and  works  of  Currie  and  White  have  been  widely  studied, 
Williams  and  Viner  have  traditionally  been  acknowledged  as  influential  figures 
only in general studies of the New Deal,  but their activity as public advisers has 
not  been  the  subject  of  in-depth  research.
1  Recent  papers  based  on  archival 
sources have provided clear evidence of extensive collaboration and overlapping 
ideas between these four economists (Sandilands 2004, Asso and Fiorito 2009, 
Nerozzi 2009). Yet, little attention has been devoted to a systematic comparison 
of their analysis of the Great Depression and their views on the pros and cons of 
fiscal and monetary policy.  
Our  aim  is  to  adopt  a  comparative  approach  to  show  the  many  points  in 
common – and yet some important differences – among their interpretations of 
the Great Depression. In particular, we will describe how Viner, Williams, Currie 
and  White’s  common  training,  personal  friendship,  and  shared  vision  on 
monetary,  fiscal  and  banking  matters  produced  an  innovative  analysis  of  the 
Great  Depression.  Their  approach  ultimately  influenced  the  Fed  and  the  U.S. 
Administration, and informed government policies to address the Depression. 
                                                           
1 On Currie and White, see Rees 1973, Boughton 2005, Sandilands 1990, and Alacevich 2005 and 
2009; on Williams and Viner, see Stein 1969, Barber 1996, and Meltzer 2003. 3 
 
Our  interest  focuses  on  how  the  views  common  to  these  four  economists 
took shape, how they evolved in a similar manner despite the many differences 
that made the thought of each of them peculiar and well-defined, and how their 
ideas travelled with them to Washington, DC and influenced processes of policy-
making  in  the  capital.  Valdemar  Carlson,  himself  a  student  of  economics  at 
Harvard  in  the  1920s,  claimed  years  ago  that  there  was  actually  no  specific 
reason  why  a  number  of  Harvard  economists  moved  to  Washington’s  federal 
government.  Certainly,  according  to  Carlson,  they  were  not  selected  based  on 
their belonging to a supposed Harvard school of thought that, in his opinion, did 
not actually exist. As Carlson put it, the reason for the large presence of former 
Harvard students in Washington had to do with the lack of alternatives for smart 
and promising students: “Trained brain power is always a scarce commodity, and 
particularly during a period of social change it is difficult to find people with the 
requisite  ability  and  imagination  to  engineer  institutional  adjustments.  In  the 
1920's there were not many first-class graduate schools and those that had an 
outstanding reputation tended to attract the more able students. It was because 
outstanding students were attracted to Harvard that so many of that university's 
economists  played  such  an  important  role  in  helping  to  fashion  the  New  Deal 
reforms” (Carlson 1968, p. 112).
2 A study by David Laidler and Roger Sandilands, 
on the contrary, has tracked the monetary roots of the Chicago School back to 
what  they  claim  are  its  real  Harvard  origins  (Laidler  and  Sandilands  2002 
[2003]). 
We adopt a different perspective. As it will become apparent below, we share 
a common analysis with Laidler and Sandilands on these four economists.  Our 
focus, however, is on how the common core of ideas shared by these economists 
took shape since their doctoral studies and evolved – and differentiated – in their 
subsequent activity of scholars and public servants in Washington, DC. We will try 
to show that that common core of ideas was an important factor in their public 
                                                           
2 For another analysis of Harvard’s Department of Economics, see Mason 1982. 4 
 
activity, the policy making process they contributed to shape, and the way their 
professional careers evolved. 
 
 
2. A Harvard (minority) tradition 
 
Scholarly  interest  in  Viner,  Williams,  Currie  and  White  grew  in  connection 
with  the  debate  over  the  origins  and  nature  of  the  Chicago  School  of  Political 
Economy. According to Laidler and Sandilands (2002 [2003]), the main ideas at 
the  roots  of  the  Chicago  monetary  tradition  were  actually  born  elsewhere, 
primarily in Harvard. Lauchlin Currie, who studied at Harvard with Allyn A. Young, 
Ralph G. Hawtrey and John H. Williams, is credited for being a precursor of Milton 
Friedman  and  Anna  Schwartz’s  analysis  of  the  depression  (Friedman  and 
Schwartz 1963). Already in 1934, Currie had acknowledged the importance of the 
contraction in money supply as a cause of the depression, and considered  the 
Federal Reserve’s lack of interest in this issue as the main culprit in the onset and 
deepening of the depression. John  H. Williams,  professor  at  Harvard,  played a 
leading role in the discussion and approval of the so-called Chicago manifesto, 
which called for a  bold program of monetary expansion  and public works;  this 
public statement was endorsed by twenty-four economists gathered at the Harris 
Foundation Conference in Chicago in January 1932. Jacob Viner, a former Harvard 
Ph.D. graduate and a prominent figure of the Chicago department of economics, 
was  regarded  by  Friedman  himself  as  one  of  the  forefathers  of  the  Chicago 
monetary tradition. Harry D. White, then a little-known economics instructor at 
Harvard  University,  contributed  with  Currie  and  Paul  T.  Ellsworth  to  a 
memorandum  presented  by  Williams  at  the  Chicago  conference  (Laidler  and 
Sandilands 2002 [2003]). Together with Paul T. Ellsworth, Albert G. Hart, Alan 
Sweezy and Martin Krost, White and Williams joined forces in campaigning for an 
emergency program of monetary stimuli and fiscal intervention.  5 
 
The  radical  and  innovative  ideas  of  the  younger  generation  of  Harvard 
economists enjoyed the support of John H. Williams, but clashed with the more 
conservative positions of the senior members of the faculty, who decidedly sided 
against any sort of State intervention. While Williams taught at Harvard for most 
of his career and was appointed in 1947 as the first Dean of the Harvard Business 
School, the group of young heretics around him rapidly became outcast: White 
and  Currie  joined  the  Roosevelt  Administration;  Hart,  a  former  undergraduate 
student of Currie at Harvard, gained his Ph.D. at Chicago and started a successful 
academic career at Columbia; Alan Sweezy, fired from Harvard in 1937, served in 
the Work Progress Administration (1938) and the Fed (1939), before returning to 
academia,  first  as  associate  professor  at  Williams  College  and  then  as  full 
professor at Caltech (1949). Viner taught at Chicago until 1946 when he moved 
to  Princeton.  From  1933  to  1945  he  served  at  the  Treasury  as  a  special 
consultant  to  Secretary  Henry  Morgenthau  Jr.  and  subsequently,  after  1943, 
became an advisor to the State Department.  
Currie,  White, Hart and  Sweezy  were recruited  in  Viner’s “Freshmen brain 
trust”  at  the  Treasury  in  the  summer  1934.  This  group  was  entrusted  with 
advising on the most important banking and monetary issues the country faced at 
the time.
3 The gathering of this group of young Harvard economists under Viner’s 
guidance  allowed  new  ideas  on  central  banking,  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  to 
circulate  in  the  Administration.  Eventually,  these  ideas  found  their  way  in 
legislation and policy decision-making. In May 1933, Williams was appointed as 
expert economist to the New York Fed, where he became vice-chairman in 1936. 
His influence spread across the Treasury and other agencies. Williams and Viner, 
                                                           
3 Viner asked Currie to draft a proposal for reforming the banking system of the United States. 
Many other prominent reports on related topics were produced around the same period, including: 
Edward C. Simmons, “The Currency System”; Benjamin Caplan, “Branch banking”; Albert G. Hart, 
“Federal credit institutions”; Lauchlin Currie, “Monetary control in the United States” and “Deposit 
Insurance”;  Alan  R.  Sweezy,  “Objectives  and  criteria  of  monetary  policy”;  Harry  D.  White, 
“Selection of a monetary standard for the United States”; and M.H. Riley, “Bank examinations and 
bank reports”. 6 
 
de facto liaison officers between the Treasury and the Fed, were not only personal 
friends;  they also  shared common views on monetary and international policy. 
White was hired at the Treasury and became head of the Division of Monetary 
Research in 1937. Currie became the closest economic adviser to Marriner Eccles, 
whom he had met when he was a consultant at the Treasury.        
 
 
3. Studying and teaching at Harvard (1914-1933) 
 
Currie, Viner, Williams and White shared an interest in original research in 
the  field  of  monetary  and  international  economics  and  banking,  and  a 
methodology that favored extensive data collection and quantitative analysis. This 
was the result of their training at Harvard University.  
Viner,  Williams  and  White  wrote  their  Ph.D.  dissertations  under  the 
supervision of Frank W. Taussig and each of them prepared a case study on the 
same general topic: the adjustment  mechanism of the balance of payments in 
presence of capital movements. Viner studied Canada during the  prewar years 
under  the  gold  standard,  Williams  studied  Argentina  between  1880  and  1900 
under a paper money regime and flexible exchange rates, and White examined 
France  from  1880  to  1913  (Viner  1924;  Williams  1920;  White  1933).  These 
studies  provided  an  empirical  validation  of  the  classical  theory  of  international 
trade. According to Viner, the case of Canada offered a confirmation of Hume’s 
price-specie flow mechanism, with some qualification due to the working of the 
flexible banking multiplier and to capital movements: foreign reserves, expansion 
of bank deposits, and domestic prices moved in the same direction, fostering the 
adjustment of the balance of trade. In this context, capital movements exerted 
mainly a stabilizing effect. A huge flow of long-term capital investments gave rise 
to a fractional demand for short-term reserves in the opposite direction, mainly 
gold  certificates  held  by  Canadian  commercial  banks  in  New  York,  which 7 
 
supported the expansion of domestic credit. Changes in foreign deposits abroad 
played the role of shock absorber, minimizing the movement of specie required to 
keep  the  exchange  rates  within  the  gold  points  and  adjusting  the  Canadian 
balance of trade according to the seasonal fluctuations in the demand for credit. 
Since  Canada  had  not  a  central  bank  at  the  time,  this  mechanism  seemed  to 
confirm the automatic functioning of the gold standard (for a discussion of this 
point see Flanders 1989: 228-229).  
Williams and White were more critical of the real working of the price-specie-
flow mechanism. A statistical analysis of the balance of payments and monetary 
conditions  of  Argentina  confirmed  that,  in  presence  of  a  paper  currency,  gold 
movements did not affect the domestic money supply but only the external value 
of  the  currency,  i.e.,  its  exchange  rates;  at  the  same  time,  the  low  export 
elasticity (due to widespread deflation in foreign markets) did not allow exchange 
rate  flexibility  to  guarantee  a  smooth  adjustment  of  the  balance  of  trade  but 
stimulated  a  growing  foreign  indebtedness.  According  to  Williams,  the  case  of 
Argentina  showed  how  capital  movements  could  be  of  a  destabilizing  nature 
despite the monetary rules that the country adopted: both under a gold standard 
and a paper standard, “a rise of prices in one country relative to others may in 
fact  attract  capital  from  abroad.  Rising  prices  usually  means  rising  profits”, 
fostering  a  cumulative  increase  in  prices,  capital  inflow  and  credit  expansion 
(Williams 1932a: 175).  
White’s  study  cast  further  doubts  over  the  traditional  views  of  external 
adjustment. He noticed that most statistical surveys on domestic prices provided 
little  support  for  Hume’s  adjustment  mechanism;  moreover,  long  term 
investments in developing countries were not matched by a parallel increase in 
export trade. White also noticed that exchange rates movements within the gold 
points did not affect the balance of trade (Flanders 1989: 237). Most importantly, 
White underscored the ability of the Bank of France to prevent substantial flows 
of gold from and to the country, which kept domestic monetary conditions more 8 
 
stable. Moreover, White showed that capital flows were endogenously driven by 
changes  in  income,  consumption  and  savings,  with  a  greater  impact  on  the 
balance  of  payments  than  changes  in  the  price  level.  White’s  adjustment 
mechanism was very close to Bertil Ohlin’s income-expenditure approach, even 
though he regarded the movements of gold and international lending as the main 
driving force in the shifts of income and aggregate demand (Flanders 1989: 241). 
While  these  studies  drew  different  conclusions  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
classical  adjustment  mechanism,  they  all  focused  on  monetary,  financial  and 
banking aggregates to explain the dynamics of domestic prices, real incomes, and 
the  balance  of  trade.  As  was  typical  of  Taussig’s  approach,  they  thoroughly 
examined  the  historical  and  institutional  environment,  and  the  banking  and 
monetary  system.  The  same  principle  and  the  same  methodological  approach 
were at the center of Currie’s Ph.D. dissertation, which focused on the functioning 
of the U.S. banking system in the post-war years (Currie 1931). 
Currie  started  working  on  his  doctoral  dissertation  under  the  tutorship  of 
Allyn A. Young, a pioneer of statistical research on the American banking system 
during  the  1920s.
4  In  1928  Currie  was  teaching  assistant  first  to  Ralph  G. 
Hawtrey, and later, after the premature death of Allyn Young in March 1929, to 
John  Williams.  His  Ph.D.  thesis  was  deeply  influenced  by  his  tutor  and  senior 
professors. Currie focused on the supply of money in the United States from the 
1920s. He adopted quite a narrow definition of money, including coins, banknotes 
and  demand  deposits,  but  excluding  time  and  saving  deposits,  which  Currie 
regarded  as  idle  balances  with  no  circulation  and  therefore  unable  to  affect 
aggregate demand. 
One of Currie’s major accomplishments was the creation of one of the first 
statistical series  of  money supply in  the United States. It  is  worth  noting  that 
Currie’s series differed substantially from the one proposed almost at the same 
                                                           
4 Young (1927; 1928). On Young’s monetary thought see Mehrling (1997); on Currie’s training at 
Harvard, see Sandilands (1990) and Laidler (1993 [2003]). Young was economic advisor to the 
Governor of the Federal Reserve of New York, Benjamin Strong (Mehrling 1997: 104).  9 
 
time by Carl Snyder, a Fed statistician, who included time and saving deposits in 
his calculation. According to Currie’s data, during the 1920s the increase in the 
money supply had been less than usually believed at that time. Currie’s findings, 
later  expanded  to  cover  the  early  depression  years,  actually  showed  that  the 
money  supply  had  ceased  to  grow  already  by  1928,  and  suffered  a  steep 
contraction from 1930 to 1932  (Currie  1933a:  86).  Currie maintained  that  the 
Federal Reserve had failed to understand the need to increase the money supply 
to mitigate the depression. For the first time, a scholar was charging the Federal 
Reserve  with  specific  responsibility  for having  worsened  the  economic  and 
monetary conditions of the country after the 1929 stock exchange crash. Currie’s 
thesis remained unpublished, but one chapter was published as a separate article 
in  1934.  In  it,  Currie  blamed  the  almost  exclusive  attention  of  the  Federal 
Reserve to the control of domestic security speculation as a major source of its 
restrictive  stance  (Currie  1934b).  However,  according  to  Currie,  the  Fed’s 
principal shortcoming was a doctrinal one: the Fed’s statute and operations were 
inspired by the so-called Commercial Loan Theory of Banking. This meant that 
the  Fed  saw  the  primary  function  of  the  banks  as  “meet[ing]  the  short  term 
borrowing needs of ‘legitimate’ business” (Currie 1934a: 34). As a consequence, 
the concerns of the Fed were primarily focused on the  composition of banking 
assets.  The  supply  of  money  and  its  connections  with  money  incomes  and 
business activity were essentially ignored.
5 
Currie’s  criticism  of  the  Commercial  Loan  Theory  of  Banking  offered 
arguments similar to those of Williams in his late 1920s and early 1930s writings. 
Williams was familiar with the most recent quantitative work in the field of money 
                                                           
5 Currie defended his dissertation at Harvard University in January 1931 but failed to win the Well 
prize,  which was  instead  awarded  to Currie’s  classmate and  close  friend Harry  White in  1933. 
Currie stayed at Harvard as an instructor. He assisted Williams in his famous Money and Banking 
Course, and was also an assistant to Joseph Schumpeter. In the following years, Currie published 
several articles based on his Ph.D. dissertation. Frank H. Knight and Jacob Viner, co-editors of the 
Journal of Political Economy, accepted two of Currie’s articles for publication. 10 
 
and banking, and shared most of the ideas set forth by Currie.
6 In his 1931 forty 
page  review  of  Keynes’s  Treatise  on  Money,  Williams  discussed  in  great  detail 
Keynes’s treatment of income-, business- and saving- deposits, assessing their 
relevance  for  the  business  cycle  and  the  level  of  aggregate  demand.  Drawing 
from Currie’s data, Williams analysed the deep divergence between the U.S. and 
the  British  systems  (Williams  1931:  566,  nt.  4).  Furthermore,  his  criticism  of 
Keynes’s early views on  the  close relation  between the  money  supply and  the 
structure  of  interest rates  seemed to fit  very well in  Currie’s monetary  control 
framework. For Williams, the connection between interest rates and investment 
expenditure  was  weak  and  uncertain.  Accordingly,  such  an  abstract  and 
immaterial  concept  as  the  Wicksellian  “natural  interest  rate”  could  not  play  a 
central role in determining the direction and the intensity of business trends and 
fluctuations  (Williams  1931:  578).  Monetary  forces  and  the  variation  of  short 
term interest rates were likely to exert a stronger direct influence on consumers 
spending, business expectations and investment decisions. Yet, Williams drew a 
less clear-cut distinction than Currie between the banking aggregates that were a 
source of spending and those that were not.
7 At the same time, he insisted that 
even if central banks could effectively control banking aggregates, they would still 
not  control  consumer spending:  “in  monetary terms, the crux  of  the matter  is 
that, while banks control the physical quantity of deposits, depositors control the 
spending of them, and changes in quantity may be offset by changes in velocity 
or in direction” (Williams 1931: 580). 
                                                           
6 In his 1931 review of the Treatise, in addition to Hawtrey, Robertson and Pigou, Williams also 
cited studies  of Harold Reed, Calvin Hoover, James Harvey Rogers, William  Trufald Foster  and 
Waddill Catchings, and Percey W. Martin. The latter, an almost unknown English author, wrote a 
book on the “Problem of Maintaining Purchasing Power”, which was positively reviewed by Viner in 
the Journal of Political Economy.    
7 Williams agreed with Keynes that demand deposits could contain a part of idle business deposits 
which were kept idle by firms, as cash reserves, and could be assimilated to saving deposits. As a 
consequence, as Williams put it, “the total of demand deposits may undergo little change from 
prosperity to depression, while yet the volume of consumer spending may be profoundly affected” 
(Williams  1931:  566).  See  also  his  treatment  of  the  effects  of  stock  market  speculation  on 
demand  deposits  and  consumers  spending,  which  he  considered  quite  complex  to  determine 
(Williams 1931: 570-572).  11 
 
Williams’s dismissal of the quantity theory in its crudest form is even more 
explicit in his discussion of the problem of price stabilization: “The central bank by 
its rate controls the size of member banks reserves (if necessary it can control 
reserves by open market operations); since member banks are always ‘loaned up’ 
to reserve limits, a change in reserves will mean a change in the amount of loans, 
which will mean a change in the amount of deposits; a change in deposits will 
produce a change in the price level. But this explanation is too simple and begs 
some  important  questions”  (Williams  1931:  574).  Thus,  one  of  the  clearest 
fallacies of the quantity theory was that it assumed other things equal: “Only if 
velocity  remains  unchanged  will  a  change  in  deposits  mean  a  corresponding 
change in the effective quantity of money, and only if goods remain unchanged 
will a change in that quantity produce an equal change in prices. Since velocity is 
subject to change during the business cycle, that proviso is extremely important. 
And since the change in quantity of deposits proceeds out of a change in quantity 
of  bank  loans,  the  presumption  is  that  more  deposits  rest  on  more  goods” 
(Williams  1931:  574-75).  Thus,  Williams  implied  that  money  creation  was  an 
endogenous  phenomenon,  arising  from  the  productive  process  which  in  turn 
regulated the demand for credit. However, “the simple quantitative comparison of 
money  and  goods  provides  no  explanation  of  how  money  is  spent.  If  to  have 
more money we must have the banks make more loans, who borrows and for 
what purpose? Different kinds of transactions require different amounts of money 
and have different degrees of effect upon the price level” (Williams 1931: 575). 
Ever since their graduate years at Harvard University, Viner, White, Currie 
and Williams shared intellectual interests and research methods. Their academic 






4. Harvard views on the Great Depression 
 
To  compare  the  views  of  the  four  Harvard  economists  on  the  onset  and 
spread  of  the  Great  Depression,  it  is  useful  to  review  the  proceedings  of  the 
Harris Foundation Conference, held at the University of Chicago in January 1932 
after  a  few  years  of  deep  crisis.  Although  only  Viner  and  Williams  presented 
research  papers  at  the  conference,  archival  evidence  provided  by  Laidler  and 
Sandilands shows that Currie and White contributed to their works (Laidler and 
Sandilands 2002 [2003]). 
At  the  conference,  Viner  argued  that  those  countries  that  had  recently 
abandoned the gold standard were better off than those that had not. Yet, he 
refused to suggest that the United States should follow the same path. According 
to some scholars, Viner’s conclusions were conservative: Viner spoke in defence 
of the gold standard doctrine, dismissing the charges that it was responsible for 
the crisis.
8 Instead, the roots of the Depression were to be sought in the powerful 
deflationary forces acting all over the world in the 1920s as a consequence of the 
heavy external imbalances originated by the war and the peace settlement. These 
forces  had  taken  momentum  through  an  asymmetric  adjustment  mechanism 
imposed  by  surplus  countries,  which  applied  self-oriented  monetary  and 
commercial policies upon deficit countries. The protectionist policies enacted by 
the  U.S.  Government  beginning  with  the  Smoot-Hawley  Tariff  Act  –  in  Viner’s 
analysis – made it more difficult for foreign countries to have access to American 
financial markets and obtain the dollars needed to finance imports and repay their 
debts. Even the sharp reversal, in the late 1920s, of the flow of American long-
term foreign investments contributed to the accumulation of gold reserves in the 
U.S.  The  consequences  for  many  foreign  countries  were  “inadequate  gold 
reserves, a constant threat to the integrity of their currencies and a deflationary 
pressure on their prices in spite of embarrassingly rigid labour and other costs 
                                                           
8  On this point see Nerozzi 2011.  13 
 
and  inflexible  internal  and  external  public  debt  burdens”  (Viner  1932[1951]: 
132). 
The  single  most  important  symptom  of  these  disequilibria  was  the 
concentration of 70% of the world’s stock of gold in only two countries: France 
and the United States. The gold inflows associated with the U.S. trade surplus not 
only were not used to expand credit; even worse, they were used for speculative 
purposes whose only effect was to reinforce the incoming trend of foreign capital:  
 
In  the  United  States  the  failure  of  member  banks,  since  1922,  to 
utilize  freely  their  rediscount  privileges  with  the  Federal  Reserve  banks 
was  one  factor  tending  to  prevent  the  increase  in  gold  reserves  from 
having its expected influence on the volume of business transactions and 
on the commodity price level. Much of the great increase in bank credit 
which did take place went into security and real estate speculation instead 
of  into  commerce;  and  while  the  price  of  securities  and  of  real  estate 
assuredly rose, the expectation of a still further rise and the increase in 
call  money  rates  which  resulted  from  the  increased  stock-market 
speculation,  drew  funds  to  this  country  instead  of driving  them  out,  as 
high commodity prices would have done (Viner 1932 [1951]: 131). 
 
The first casualties were overseas countries, struggling to defend their stocks 
of  official  reserves.  But  according  to  Viner,  while  the  accumulation  of  gold  in 
France was due to institutional factors, in the United States it was attributable to 
the  ominous  monetary  and  commercial  policies  enacted  by  the  Fed  and  the 
Hoover administration.
9 After 1927, Viner stated,  
 
The Federal Reserve Board has revealed to the outsider no greater 
capacity  to  formulate  a  consistent  policy,  unless  a  program  of  thrift, 
                                                           
9 See Viner 1932 [1951]: 131-132. 14 
 
punctuated  at  intervals  by  homeopathic  doses  of  belated  inflation  or 
deflation and rationalized by declaration of impotence, can be accepted 




One  of  the  factors  that  prevented  the  Fed  from  effectively  stabilizing 
business conditions was its complex and decentralized institutional structure. 
 
Our central banking organization is over-complex, too decentralized, 
and too much subject to regional pressure to act quickly and decisively in 
the international sphere. Moreover, […] while the New York Federal Bank 
has made more effort than any other central bank institution to develop 
a program and a technique of credit control with a view to stabilization, it 
has at critical moments found itself at cross purposes with, and inhibited 
from  action  by,  a  Federal  Reserve  Board  with  an  attitude  towards  its 
functions  resembling with almost  miraculous  closeness that  of  Bank of 
England during its worst period (Viner 1932 [1951]: 134).
11  
                                                           
10    In  a  speech  delivered  the  previous  summer  at  Williamstown,  Viner  had  been  even  more 
explicit, blaming on the Fed for the dramatic and sudden decline in aggregate demand: “Except 
under Governor Strong, the Federal Reserve Board has avoided having a definite policy; it has 
acted in a purely opportunist manner. [...] Many Englishmen feel that the attempt of the Federal 
Reserve  Board  from  1927  to  1929  to  check  the  growth  of  bank  credit  which  was  supporting 
security  speculation  in  the  United  States  was  an  unfavourable  factor  for  England.  It  was 
impossible  to  distinguish  between  credit  expansion  for  legitimate  business  purposes  and 
expansion for speculation. The large demand for both types raised the money rate in the United 
States,  and  this  drew  money  from  England  to  this  country  and  checked  American  foreign 
investments  [...].  Abroad  central  bankers  and  economists  are  unanimous  in  the  view  that  the 
Federal Reserve System has missed important opportunities” (Viner 1931: 189). 
11 These arguments anticipated Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their explanation of the 
Great Depression. After recalling the analysis and policy proposals that Viner had expounded in 
1932-1933, Friedman acknowledged Viner as a precursor: “What in the field of interpretation and 
policy did Keynes have to offer those of us who learned economics at a Chicago that was filled 
with these views? Can anyone who knows my work read Viner’s comments and not see the direct 
links between them and Anna Schwartz’s and my Monetary History (1963) or between them and 
the empirical Studies on the Quantity Theory of Money (1956)? Indeed […] I have myself been 
amazed  to  discover  how  precisely  it  [Viner  1932(1951)]  foreshadows  the  main  thesis  of  our 
Monetary History for the depression period” (Friedman 1972 [2003]: 156). 15 
 
 
Given the asymmetric and uncooperative way in which the gold standard had 
been managed, Viner acknowledged that, as later pointed out by many historical 
reconstructions, many countries could have incurred a lesser degree of suffering, 
had they “had a well-regulated paper currency instead of adhering to the world’s 
ill-regulated gold standard” (Viner 1932[1951]: 133).
12 The “golden fetters” had 
effectively prevented many countries from offsetting the deflationary forces under 
way, and those who had freed themselves were likely to gain. Yet, Viner’s view of 
the United States was quite different: because the gold reserves of the United 
States were large enough to allow a substantial expansion of the money supply 
without  seriously  threatening  convertibility,  there  was  no  need  for  the  United 
States to abandon the gold standard (Viner 1932[1951]: 139).  
Viner’s critique was shared by other speakers at the Conference, especially 
by John Williams, who blamed the Fed for its wrong model of banking behaviour 
and central banking. While Williams did not stress the responsibility of the Fed in 
the uneven distribution of gold among countries during the 1920s, he added new 
arguments to Viner’s criticism on the credit restriction of 1927-1929:  
 
After  1924,  when  our  gold  holdings  ceased  to  grow,  demand 
deposits ceased to expand, but the growth of loans and of time-deposits 
continued.  The  phenomenal  increase  of  time-deposits  since  the  war 
appears  to  indicate  not  unwillingness  of  our  banking  system  to  utilize 
gold but saturation of demand for credit. As bank assets expanded, the 
public transferred an increasing portion of the resultant deposits to idle 
deposits; and during the boom of 1928-1929 these deposits, in the form 
of  “loans  for  others,”  served  to  finance  security  speculation  (Williams 
1932b, 150). 
                                                           
12 Among recent scholars, on this point, see for example Bernanke (1995). 16 
 
 
As  already  pointed  out  by  Keynes,  the  increase  of  U.S.  interest  rates, 
designed  to  curb  speculation  on  the  stock  market,  played  a  major  role  in 
worsening  monetary  and  credit  conditions  at  home  as  well  as  in  many  other 
foreign  countries.  Banks  were  held  responsible  for  short-circuiting  the  credit 
system. They showed no capacity for influencing the demand for credit and steer 
it toward higher quality and more productive purposes. According to Williams, 
 
the reserve system met [the boom] with an attempt to discriminate 
between  loans  for  commercial  and  loans  for  speculative  purposes.  Its 
complete failure should explode once for all the notion that it is possible 
to  dictate  the  uses  to  which  credit  is  put,  rather  than  the  quantity  of 
credit for all purposes. 
The draining of foreign funds into our stock market seems, without 
question, to have been one cause of the depression. The most significant 
aspect of the movement was that it was in response to high money rates 
ascribable in part to the Reserve banks’ efforts to check domestic credit 
expansion.  It  revealed  clearly  how  the  problem  of  credit  control  by 
central banks has changed since the war (Williams 1932b, 151).  
 
Currie shared similar views. He stated that the restrictive policies enacted by 
the Fed to control the stock market boom before 1929 had actually missed the 
target, as higher interest rates ended up undermining business conditions more 
than financial speculation (Currie 1934b). Currie referred to Keynes’s Treatise: to 
have  the  occurrence  of  a  boom,  it  must  be  assumed  that  investments  exceed 
savings. But, as Currie put it, 
 
In 1929 the real danger, as we now know, was the very opposite. An 
expansion of investments was necessary in order to absorb the labor that 17 
 
would  otherwise  lose  employment  and  to  increase  incomes  that  were 
shortly to become deficient relative to output of finished goods [...]. The 
level of stock prices should not in itself be a matter of concern to the 
central bank but rather the net effect of speculation in conjunction with 
other forces, on saving and investments (Currie 1934a: 172-3).
13   
 
Currie  thoroughly  discussed  Keynes’s  and  Williams’s  accounts  of  the  likely 
effects of stock market speculation on the demand for credit, interest rates, and 
income. He recognized that these effects could only  be measured  by empirical 
analysis of a wide set of relevant data, which were not available at the time. Yet, 
according to Currie, stock market speculation seemed to have been “increasing 
the effective purchasing power of the community,” because while in 1928-1929 
the  volume  of  money  had  declined,  the  monetary  income  had  been  growing 
“sufficiently to take off a considerably increased flow of goods at stable prices” 
(Currie 1934a: 151).     
Whatever the effect of stock market speculation on the national income, the 
Fed’s monetary policy had precipitated the country in the deepest depression it 
had  ever  experienced.  As  the  onset  of  the  crisis  was  caused  by  the  steep 
monetary contraction in the means of payments of the country, the way out was 
to be looked for in a full reversal of that policy.    





                                                           
13 Sandilands underscores that the high place that Currie gave to the relation between saving and 
investment  for  monetary  policy  was  influenced  by  pre-General  Theory  Keynes.  Instead,  Currie 
remained  very  skeptical  of  the  new  definition  of  savings  that  Keynes  proposed  in  the  General 
Theory, and of the role of the Keynesian multiplier in bringing about equilibrium between savings 
and investment via multiple expansion and contraction of income (Sandilands 1990: 36). 18 
 
5. Waging for monetary expansion  
 
According  to  Williams,  the  traditional  practice  of  central  banking  was 
obsolete  in  the  post-war  world.  The  huge  amount  of  speculative  capital 
movements  and  the  interdependence  of  central  banks  as  regards  their  foreign 
reserves  exacerbated  the  conflict  between  domestic  stabilization  and  the 
functioning  of  the  international  monetary  system.  While  the  Genoa  Conference 
and the stabilization loans of the League of Nations had somehow increased the 
efficiency and elasticity of the world’s money supply, currency reserves held by 
national  central  banks  in  the  main  international  money  markets  exposed  the 
national  banking  systems  to  a  high  degree  of  instability:  “Unlike  the  member 
bank reserves in the central bank,” Williams wrote, “they are subject to no legal 
compulsion and may be withdrawn at the will of the foreign owner. They are, in 
consequence, highly unstable and are most apt to be withdrawn when they can 
least be spared. The effect is similar in kind to hoarding, to a run on a bank, or to 
a  wholesale  withdrawal  of  reserves  by  member  banks  from  the  central  bank” 
(Williams 1932: 147). His conclusion was unequivocal: “the transfers of foreign 
balances  can  produce  a  collapse  of  the  international  gold  standard”  (Williams 
1932: 147). Central banks were thus forced to have a surplus of reserves above 
ordinary requirements: only “if Central Banks reserve is large, or if the system 
utilizes  reserve  with  great  economy,  the  country  is  free  to  pursue  an  internal 
monetary  policy  with  comparative  disregard  to  external  influences”  (Williams 
1932:  147).  Yet,  the  creation  of  such  a  robust  shield  against  capital  flights 
conflicted with the smooth functioning of the gold standard, which was based on 
the assumption that banks were “loaned up” and properly responded to a change 
in their reserves. 
Williams  recognized  that,  in  its  first  decade  of  activities,  the  Fed  had 
managed reserves efficiently. Those past accomplishments, however, contrasted 
with  the  poor  outcomes  of  the  Fed’s  policy  in  the  last  few  years.  Traditional 19 
 
instruments of monetary policy had failed to smooth the peaks and troughs of the 
cycle and contrast deflation. All attempts to follow preconceived rules of behavior 
failed to maintain stability in the money market. The system suffered for the lack 
of direct intervention and full discretionary powers: 
 
It  is  this  fact,  without  doubt,  which  has  made  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  since  the  war  the  world’s  most  interesting  and 
important  laboratory  for  the  study  of  monetary  problems.  With  a 
system like ours it is futile to endeavor to establish legal safeguards 
as substitutes for management. The policy of imposing restraints by 
such  means  as  narrow  interpretations  of  rediscount  eligibility, 
attempts  rigidly  to  mark  off  investment  from  commercial  banking, 
legal preventives of speculative uses of credit is indeed a recognition 
of the dangers inherent in an economical system as ours. But such a 
policy  does  not  check  expansion  and  proves  injurious  when,  as 
recently, the problem is to check deflation. If pushed as far as the 
Glass committee intended in its original bill, it would seriously impair 
the  money  market.  The  more  effective  policy,  and  the  only  one 
consistent  with  the  nature  of  the  process  of  credit  creation  and 
diffusion, would seem to be to maintain a broad contact between the 
central bank and the money market, to endow the central bank with 
wide  powers  of  discretionary  control,  and  to  insist  upon  their  use 
(Williams 1932b: 155). 
 
Control  functions,  and  especially  qualitative  control  of  bank  assets, 
became  a  central  topic  in  Williams’s  reasoning:  Central  Banks  should  be 
prompt and able to use all their discretionary powers to exert credit control, 
without being inhibited by rigid rules in the selection of bank assets eligible 
for  rediscount:  “There  must  be  credit  control  […].  The  choice  is  merely 20 
 
between better or worse credit control […]. Under such conditions there is 
no need of bank reserves, either by the member banks or the central bank; 
the sole test of the workability of the system is the quality of the assets of 
the member banks” (Williams 1932b: 135 and 137).  
The  Fed  had  been  established  with  the  aim  of  making  the  supply  of 
credit most efficient; the crisis showed the vital role of qualitative control of 
bank assets. Yet the criteria of Fed’s supervision over the banking system 
should be shaped along a wider set of objectives. While Williams did not use 
Currie’s term of Commercial Loans Theory, the affinities were nonetheless 
explicit:   
 
It would be untrue to say that the founders [of the Fed] were 
unaware of the necessity for control. They prescribed safeguards, but 
not  the  proper  ones.  There  is  deeply  imbedded  in  the  Act  the 
philosophy that member banks credit can be controlled by prescribing 
the uses to which central bank credit shall be put; and further, that if 
central bank credit is confined to these proper uses there will be no 
problem of control. It has taken some eighteen  years of experience, 
including  two major booms  and depressions, to  reveal the fallacies 
inherent in this philosophy; and notwithstanding the revelations, the 
philosophy  persists  strongly  in  the  bill  now  before  the  Glass 
Committee (Williams 1932b: 137-138). 
 
To  reverse  the  powerful  deflationary  tendencies  at  work,  the  Fed  should 
undertake a sudden and bold program of monetary expansion: “Vigorous open-
market operations” should be enacted “to reduce rediscounts of member banks 
and  to  increase  the  supply  of  purchasing  power”.  At  the  same  time,  Williams 
urged “the substantial reduction or cancellation of war debts and the scaling down 
of trade  barriers”  (Williams  1932b:  157). Williams was  also  more  explicit  than 21 
 
Viner in detailing the type and the amount of market operations the Fed should 
start up in order to reverse deflation. The most urgent problem was to get the 
banking system out of debt by buying securities stocked in the balance sheets of 
banks. This would encourage new loans and circulation of money and upgrade the 
quality of assets. The stock of securities of the Fed should reach a minimum of $ 
1.6 billion, which meant doubling the current Fed holdings (Wright 1932: 249).  
Laidler  and  Sandilands  (2002;  2003)  have  described  how  accurately  this 
suggestion  matched  the  1932  Harvard  memorandum  by  Currie,  Ellsworth  and 
White,  which  Williams  was  probably  very  well  familiar  with.  Moreover,  this 
unpublished  document  contained  most  of  the  recommendations  prepared  by 
several participants in the Chicago conference and inspired by Williams and Viner. 
These recommendations had been sent by telegram to President Hoover at the 
end of the conference. In addition to open market operations and the easing of 
international  monetary  relations  (war  debts  and  tariffs),  the  Chicago  telegram 
urged Hoover to keep a steady flow of public works expenditures. It also stressed 
the need to widen the range of assets eligible for rediscount by commercial banks 
to include, among others, government securities. Viner underscored the crucial 
connection  between  government  spending,  credit  expansion  and  the  growth  of 
money  supply,  a  typical  monetarist  argument  for  fiscal  deficits  as  an  effective 
means to put money into circulation (Tavlas 1997, 1998a, 1998b). This focus on 
fiscal expenditures as an accompanying measure to open market operations was 
even  clearer  in  the  Harvard  memorandum,  which  stressed  the  need  for  the 
Government  to  undertake  a  “program  of  public  construction  on  a  nationwide 
scale.” The main argument was to ensure that the money put in circulation would 
encourage adequate expenditures:  
 
Some people feel that an increase in means of payments would have 
no perceptible effect since, they say, there is plenty of money now; the 
real difficulty is in getting it spent. We can dispose of this objection very 22 
 
briefly  by  pointing  out  that  we  have  provided  for  the  spending  of  the 
increased means of payments by linking the plan for deposit expansion 
to  one  providing  for  public  works  with  no  immediate  rise  in  taxes.  If 
there  is  one  point  on  which  everyone  is  agreed,  it  is  that  any  money 
borrowed  by  public  bodies  will  be  spent  (Currie,  Ellsworth  and  White 
1932 [2003]: 275-6).    
 
In his Chicago speech, Williams had somehow downplayed the role of fiscal 
policy. By contrast, Viner had been one of the first American economists to justify 
fiscal deficits in a depression and to dismiss the dogma that public budgets should 
always be balanced at the end of a fiscal year. Yet, in their campaign for anti-
depression policies, Viner and Williams agreed that the best way toward recovery 
was an extensive use of open market operations. The crisis had come from the 
heart of the banking system and deflation was driven by the contraction of credit 
and demand deposits by commercial banks, which were desperately trying to get 
out of debt. To stimulate credit creation, banks should be provided with excess 
reserves.  
The recommendations of the Chicago Conference did not go unheard. One 
month  later,  the  Glass-Steagall  Act  introduced  the  option  to  keep  Federal 
Treasury Bills and other non short-term commercial paper in banks’ reserves. In 
the  spring  of  1932  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  began  a  massive  campaign  of 
purchases in the open market, pumping almost 1.1 billion dollars into the system 
(Meltzer  2003:  358-363).  In  August,  interest  rates  returned  to  previous  year 
levels and the Open Market Purchases Committee decided to stop the purchase of 
securities.
14 However, this program failed to attain the desired expansion of credit 
                                                           
14 The main outcome of the open market operations carried out in the spring of 1932 was to lower 
the member banks’ demand and the rate for rediscounting within the Fed to the level of August 
1931.  According  to  the  Riefler-Burgess  doctrine  (Burgess  1927)  which  had  guided  the  Open 
Market  Purchases  Committee’s  action  since  the  1920s,  that  was  the  desired  result  and  the 
committee decided to cease operations (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963: table 17). 23 
 
by  member banks  of  the  Fed  system.  At the  same  time,  a new  wave of bank 
failures began fuelled by depositors’ panic: from 1930 to 1933, one third of U.S. 
commercial banks closed. Internal and external drains on gold reserves imperilled 
gold convertibility  and produced a further  reduction of the  money supply.   On 
March 6, 1933 President Roosevelt declared, through the Emergency Banking Act, 
a week  of  bank  holiday  and the  suspension of dollar convertibility.  The United 
States  left  the  gold  standard  system  and  were  determined  to  pursue  anti-
depression policies without the threat of gold drains.  
In the following months, Viner and Williams were called for advice by the 
Farm  Credit  Administration  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York, 
respectively.  On  March  1934,  Viner  was  appointed  special  assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  Treasury  Henry  Morgenthau,  Jr.  and  recruited  Currie,  White  and 
other young economists from Harvard. The four Harvard economists were thus 
offered the opportunity to directly affect the policy-making process and influence 
government decisions in response to the contraction.  
 
 
6. A monetary framework for fiscal policy  
 
The failure of the 1932 Open Market Purchase Program was not a surprise 
to the four Harvard economists: they were aware that banks could use the newly 
acquired reserves to strengthen their balances, without necessarily expanding the 
money supply or reviving credit conditions. Monetary policy alone did not suffice 
to foster recovery. 
 
The appearance of excess reserves came as a distinct shock to 
many  monetary  theorists  in  the  early  thirties.  Much  of  previous 
monetary theory had been built on the assumption that the banks 
would always be loaned up.  But it became unmistakably clear, as 24 
 
bank reserves expanded, that bankers were interested in the quality 
as well as in the quantity of their assets, and rather than assume 
undue risks would hold their reserves idle. It was at this point that 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  joined  hands.  The  financing  of  deficits 
combined  with  pressure  through  reserves,  affords  an  avenue  for 
expansion of bank assets and deposits accompanied by a decline in 
interest rates. In addition to the money thus created, government 
borrowing provides an outlet for old deposits which might otherwise 
remain idle rather than assume the risks of investment in depression 
(Williams 1942: 237).  
 
According  to  Williams,  the  transmission  mechanism  was  expected  to  run 
from bank reserves (affected by open market operations) to short term rates and 
then to long term rates, fostering investments and aggregate demand. Since the 
1920s, the stock of financial assets in the portfolios of banks had been growing, 
while commercial paper had been declining. Thus, an increase of reserves was 
likely to foster bank’s demand of all the types of assets they held, both short and 
long  term.  The  possibility  to  hold  treasury  bonds  as  a  reserve  eligible  for 
rediscount strengthened bank’s asset position and lowered interest rates. 
Viner’s view was that the 1932 Fed’s policy had not been strong enough 
and  had  overlapped  with  (but  not  added  to)  the  action  of  the  Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. While succeeding in checking the speed of the decline, the 
program  of  monetary  expansion  had  not  been  able  to  reverse  the  powerful 
deflationary forces at work.   
 
It  is  often  said  that  the  federal  government  and  the  Federal 
Reserve system have practiced inflation during the depression and that 
no beneficial effects resulted from it. What in fact happened was that 
they  made  mild  motions  in  the  direction  of  inflation,  which  did  not 25 
 
succeed  in  achieving  it,  did  not  succeed  even  in  accomplishing 
“reflation,” but which probably did slow up somewhat the rate of price 
decline. The loans of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in so far 
as  they  involved  new  credits  instead  of  substitution  of  sound  for 
unsound  credit,  the  open  market  purchases  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Banks,  have  been  in  the  main  but  two  different  aspects  of  a  single 
operation […]. 
At no time, moreover, since the beginning of the depression has 
there  been  for  as  long  as  four  months  a  net  increase  in  the  total 
volume of bank credit outstanding. On the contrary, the government 
and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  operations  have  not  nearly  sufficed  to 
countervail the contraction of credit on the part of the member and 
non-member  banks.  There  has  been  no  net  inflation  of  bank  credit 
since the end of 1929. There has been instead a fairly continuous and 
unprecedentedly  great  contraction  of  credit  during  this  entire  period 
(Viner 1933a: 21- 22). 
 
An overly negative judgment was also expressed by Currie:  
 
It  is  generally  held  that  the  reserve  administration  strove 
energically to bring about an expansion throughout the depression 
but  that  contraction  continued  despite  its  efforts.  Actually  the 
Reserve administration’s policy was one of almost complete passivity 
and quiescence (Currie 1934a: 146-147).  
 
This point of view contrasted with Williams’s more moderate interpretation. 
According  to  Williams,  the  Fed’s  1932  operations  produced  some  important 
results,  first, by “strengthening the capital structure and the general condition of 
the  banks,”  and  second,  by  “increasing  member  bank  reserves  in  the  hope  of 26 
 
stimulating through persistent pressure of huge excess reserves bank loans and 
investments  and  the  consequent  creation  of  new  bank  deposits.”  Williams 
concluded that “the Fed performed very well in its capacity to act as the fiscal 
agent, assisting the Treasury and financing through Treasury security issues the 
Government’s  expenditures,  including  the  emergence  spending  program.”  The 
only  expectation  that  the  1932  turn  of  the  Fed  monetary  policy  failed  to 
materialize  was  the  revival  of  private  investment.  According  to  Williams,  the 
explanation for this  failure did  not  lay within  the  banking  system.  It  would  be 
useful to conjecture “how much excess reserves it would take to break down the 
bankers’ liquidity complex.” In fact, “as the excess reserves continued to pile up 
and  attain  huge  dimensions  and  interest  rates  sank  to  levels  never  previously 
reached, it was generally recognized that whatever may have been the defects of 
central  banks’  policy,  the  main  trouble  laid  elsewhere”  (Williams  1941  [1949]: 
219). Thus the most important factor in the declining flow of investments was the 
lack of business confidence which turned itself in a sluggish demand for credit.  
This  conviction  paralleled  Viner’s  own  interpretation  of  the  inability  of 
monetary  policy  to  foster  recovery.  According  to  Viner,  a  crucial  factor  in  the 
business  cycle  had  a  psychological  nature:  the  cycle  basically  depended  on 
expectations about the future trend of prices and sales which determined the rate 
at which firms were willing to make investments, using their own idle funds or 
applying  to  banks  for  access  to  newly  created  purchasing  power.  Viner  clearly 
pointed  out  that  business  prospects  were  self-fulfilling.  In  spite  of  an  absolute 
increase in bank reserves, when firms were unwilling to make investments credit 
expansion could not occur. The result was the piling up of excess reserves. While 
at the Treasury in 1934, with the help of Charles O. Hardy, Viner conducted an 
inquiry  on  the  availability  of  credit  in  the  Chicago  Federal  Reserve  district, 
showing  that  banks  were  not,  in  the  main,  rejecting  demand  for  new  loans; 
rather,  it  was  demand  for credit  which had  been  declining.  Thus,  according to 27 
 
Viner and Hardy, no credit crunch was occurring at the time (Nerozzi 2007: 49-
50).   
Once  the  depression  had  started,  it  did  not  provoke  a  deficiency  of 
purchasing power but, rather, a decline in its velocity, which was likely to move 
pro-cyclically.  Yet,  according  to  Viner,  it  was  not  the  transaction  velocity  of 
money which was relevant in determining the low level of aggregate demand, but 
rather what he called the final purchases velocity of money, i.e., the rate of use 
of purchasing power in making final consumption and investment expenditures. 
These transactions should be distinguished from those which were realized for the 
transfer of real or financial assets but did not produce income. At least for 1933, 
Viner was convinced that the latter was significantly lower than the former.
15  
This vision paralleled with the one expounded by Currie in his 1934 book. 
While blaming the onset of the crisis on the contraction of the quantity of money 
which had impaired business conditions at home and abroad, Currie thought that 
the continuation of the crisis after the 1932 monetary expansion was mainly due 
to  the  “abnormal  loss  of  confidence”  that  three  years  of  steep  depression  had 
engendered  in  the  business  community  (see  also  Sandilands  1990:  49-50). 
Currie,  like  Viner,  regarded  velocity  as  the  crucial  factor  in  explaining  the 
inadequate level of aggregate demand at a time when banks were piling up idle 
reserves and when interest rates had reached very low figures. Again, it was not 
the transaction velocity of money which was important, but the income velocity of 
money, whose calculation for the period 1921-1932 Currie had been the first to 
                                                           
15 An explanation of why money velocity could frustrate reflation and the expansion of income can 
be found in a letter to Bertil Ohlin: “I accept what you call a ‘secondary expansion’ through the 
multiplying influence on purchases of a given increase in the means of payment, but I do not like 
your explanation of it which makes it seem as if (1) the crude circulation of a given amount of 
money in a given period of time and (2) its use for what I would call ultimate consumption and 
investment purchases, are identical in amount. Such relevant data as I have been able to find 
indicate that this multiplier is small and in some cases may even be a divider, even when the 
crude  circulation  is  very  high.  In  other  words,  I  do  not  think  that  ordinarily  the  total  annual 
volume of ultimate consumption and investment purchases is much greater than the total average 
volume  of  means  of  payment  in  existence  in  a  country  during  that  year.  During  1933,  I  feel 
certain the former was smaller than the latter for the United States” (Viner to Ohlin 1933, Jacob 
Viner Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Memorial Library, Princeton University). 28 
 
endeavor (Currie 1933).
16 According to Currie, the income velocity of money had 
been declining since 1929, worsening the effects of the contraction of the money 
supply (Sandilands 1990: 42). The most important cause in the decrease in the 
income  velocity  was  the  worsening  of  business  expectations  concerning 
prospective sales and prices. Once precipitated in this state of affairs, monetary 
policy could not be the principal means of salvation and ought to be supplanted 
by other measures, first of all, fiscal policy. 
While the first evidences of Viner’s advocacy of fiscal policy date back to the 
summer 1931 and those of Currie and White to January 1932, we noted above 
that government expenditures were seen at the time as a reinforcing measure to 
monetary policy. In 1933 the situation had changed in many respects and Viner 
was  one  of  the  first  economists  to  state  clearly  that  a  bold  program  of 
government expenditures was the best means to foster recovery: 
 
The  most  promising  method,  I  think,  is  that  of  governmental 
expenditures financed by borrowing from the banking system, with the 
hope that what the banks lend is newly created credit or credit which 
otherwise would have remained idle and not funds that would otherwise 
have been used by private business (Viner 1933c: 133). 
 
I am very much in favor of a program of public works, as a means 
both  of  relieving  unemployment  and  of  stimulating  an  upturn  in 
business. It is in this way, and in this way alone, that I would favour 
deliberate credit expansion under government auspices (Viner to Albert 
                                                           
16  Sandilands  remarks  that  “total  transaction  included  intermediate  payments  as  well  as  an 
enormous volume of transfer payments, especially the sale and purchase of financial claims […]  
Currie argued that there can be a huge increase in transaction velocity with no increase in the 
income velocity” (Sandilands 1990, p. 39).  29 
 
W. Luse, 1933, January 24, Jacob Viner Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, 
Princeton University, box 38, f. 6).
17 
  
This  vision continued  to  steer Viner’s  activity  during  his tenure as  Special 
Assistant to the Treasury. After an initial inquiry carried out during the summer 
of  1934  by  his  Ph.D.  student  Simon  Leland  regarding  the  total  expenses  and 
revenues of the public sector considered as a whole, Viner concluded that the 
increase in Government expenditures had been compensated by a corresponding 
decrease on the part of the Federal States and other public agencies. With these 
figures he tried to convince Morgenthau and Roosevelt that public works had to 
be decidedly increased (Nerozzi 2007: 55).  
At the same time, Viner induced Currie to develop, with the help of Currie’s 
student  Martin  Krost,  the  series  of  the  “pump  priming  deficits”  in  order  to 
measure their effects on the national income and convince the Administration on 
empirical  grounds  of  the  economic  soundness  of  deficit  spending
18.  Currie’s 
statistical  studies  on  the  “pump-priming  deficit  series,”  which  were  later 
developed  at  the  Federal  Reserve,  provided  a  theoretical  justification  to 
deliberate fiscal deficits and a guideline in the selection of the proper Government 
expenses  and  investments  in  order  to  enhance  the income  velocity  of  money. 
Currie developed and further refined these inquiries during his activity at the Fed, 
providing  a  coherent  theoretical  and  empirical  support  for  a  proper  fiscal 
intervention,  well before the General Theory  came to the United States (Stein 
1969: 166; Sandilands 1990: 68-78). The article by Currie and Krost made use 
                                                           
17 Albert W. Luse was Secretary manager of the Chicago Face Brick Bureau. Contrary to Hawtrey’s 
“Treasury view,” an increase in Government expenditures would have been effective even without 
credit creation. The availability of idle funds and bank reserves could be sufficient to support a 
wide  expansion  of  public  expenditures  without  any  subtraction  of  purchasing  power  from  the 
private sector. According to Hawtrey, if public work expenditures were not coupled with money 
creation, they would have displaced private investments. Yet he conceded that some exception 
could be made when the velocity of money was increasing (Hawtrey 1925: 41-42).  
18 Sweezy 1972: 118; see also Viner to Patinkin, January 15, 1970, cited in Patinkin 1969[2003]: 
114. 30 
 
of  the  typically  Keynesian  rationale  that  business  expectations  depended  on 
aggregate  demand,  which,  in  turn,  resulted  from  the  balance  between 
investment and voluntary saving.  
While this vision was largely influenced by Keynes’s early 1930s writings, the 
four Harvard economists reacted quite critically to the publication of the General 
Theory. Viner regarded Keynes’s treatment of liquidity preference as an undue 
simplification of the complex causal relationship between money, interest rates 
and different types of financial assets (Viner 1936). Currie did not share Keynes’s 
definition of liquidity preference as demand for money; on the contrary, he was 
positive  that  liquidity  preference  could  be  satisfied  by  holding  short-term 
interest-bearing assets. Currie criticized what he saw as Keynes’s insistence on 
the  interest  rate  as  the  principal  force  influencing  the  decision  to  invest.  As 
Sandilands put it, for Currie “business was much more influenced by the state of 
effective demand, sales, and prices than by the interest rate” (Sandilands 1990: 
86).
19 This criticism of Keynes’s exclusive insistence upon interest rates as the 
only  available  transmission  mechanism  running  from  the  money  supply  to 
aggregate  demand  was  shared  also  by  Williams,  who  pointed  out  that  low 
interest rates should be looked upon from the point of view of lenders, i.e., as a 
loss of income and a reduced incentive to depart from liquidity preference, and 
                                                           
19 Currie doubted that a general theory could explain individual business cycles. Likewise, he was 
skeptical of Keynes’s proposition that the marginal propensity to save would rise over time, and of 
Hansen’s depiction of a “mature economy” where demand stops growing. Following Knight, Currie 
considered wants insatiable and potential demand growing. Also, Currie maintained that Keynes 
confused money and savings, while he preferred to distinguish between the demand for money 
proper and the demand for interest-bearing assets: the former, together with the money supply, 
influenced the price level, the latter the interest rate. In sum, Currie judged the General Theory 
unable  to  explain  cyclical  macroeconomic  instability.  Sandilands  wrote  that  “His  own  thinking, 
influenced by Keynes’s earlier work, had already provided him with what he regarded as more 
satisfactory explanations of cyclical instability, which in turn offered a rationale for counter-cyclical 
monetary and fiscal policy. His analysis and policy conclusions were based on an examination of 
movements  in  the  money  supply  and  the  determinants  of  its  demand  (velocity),  and  of  the 
relationship between an estimated full employment national income potential, the expected full 
employment  level  of  savings  (leakages),  and  the  corresponding  combined  total  of  private 
investment and government net contribution required to offset those leakages” (Sandilands 1990: 
86). 31 
 
thus  as  depressing  aggregate  demand.  When  interest  rates  were  very  low,  “a 
wide range of institutions and individuals dependent upon fixed income-yielding 
investments  suffer  losses  of  income  whose  effects  upon  their  ability  and 
willingness  to  invest  further,  their  sense  of  security,  and  even  their  ability  to 
maintain consumption, work directly counter to the purpose of the easy money 
policy” (Williams 1942: 244). 
Both Currie and Williams were skeptical of the multiplier. Their own advocacy 
of  fiscal  policy  and  deficit  spending  rested  on  the  argument  that  the  most 
important  effects  of  public  spending  depended  upon  business  psychology.
20 
According to Williams “not the least of our dangers is that of confusing this rather 
mechanical monetary concept with the deep-seated forces with which we should 
be mainly concerned in our analysis of the economic effects of deficit spending” 
(Williams 1941 [1949]: 223).
21  
A program of public works would offer industrial firms a growing outlet for 
their production, inducing them to use their purchasing power or apply for new 
credit in order to increase production and start up new investments. Yet, though 
not  independent  from  aggregate  demand,  confidence  was  the  main  source  of 
business recovery. The public sector could not do the entire work, and the private 
economy  needed  to  play  a  major  part  in  increasing  the  use  of  the  existing 
purchasing power:  
 
                                                           
20 As Sandilands put it, the Currie-Krost article “postulated a multiplier (secondary spending) but 
professed to see no way of predicting its magnitude. The pump priming analogy was dropped […] 
and, instead, stress was laid on the phrase ‘income-increasing expenditures’” (Sandilands 1990: 
176). 
21 While Currie, White and Viner supported fiscal policy and shared a similar vision of the way it 
worked, we have less clear evidence about Williams’s views in this respect: though in his later 
recollections  he  placed  himself  among  the  early  supporters  of  the  pump  priming  argument 
designed  to  restore  business  confidence  and  private  investments,  he  dissented  from  1938 
spending program.  
 32 
 
There will not be recovery through the method of inflation unless 
there is an expansion in the use of means of payments. That expansion 
will not take place except through the mediation of banks in granting 
new loans or making new investments, or of individuals in making more 
rapid  use  of  their  existing  funds  in  purchases  for  consumption  or 
investment. […] 
The Government itself cannot achieve inflation. […] The American 
Government  can  give  a  stimulus,  encourage  it,  can  take  a  moderate 
share in it, but the major part must be done by the general public, and 
it will take the form, as already pointed out, of a speeding up in the rate 
at which business men use such resources as they still have, and the 
rate at which they ask and induce banks to create new funds for them 
(Viner 1933b: 133-134). 
 
Business  confidence  was  a  very  volatile  variable,  which  the  Government 
should  take  carefully  into  account  by  avoiding  measures  and  practices  that 
alarmed  businessmen  and  fed  into  their  fears  about  the  future.  The  Harvard 
economists’  opposition  to  the  National  Recovery  Administration  and  other 
structuralist  reforms  typical  of  the  early  New  Deal  is  largely  explained  by  this 
conviction.  Moreover,  they  fiercely  criticized  the  “mature  economy”  idea, 
formulated by Alvin Hansen, stating the inability of modern capitalist societies to 
provide  an  adequate  volume  of  private  investments.  According  to  this  vision, 
government intervention by means of deficit spending should be regarded as a 
permanent feature of the US economy, instead of an anti-cyclical device to be 
reversed in the upswing (Sandilands: 86; Williams 1941, 1942).  
The  1937-1938  recession  was  a  crucial  moment  for  the  four  Harvard 
economists  turned  public  servants:  starting  from  a quite  similar  analysis,  they 
came to disagree upon the proper measures that should be undertaken. Budget 33 
 
deficits could lead to potentially opposite outcomes: as long as they were able to 
convince  firms  that  aggregate  demand  for  their  products  was  increasing,  they 
were  successful;  but  as  businessmen  anticipated  future  tax  increases  or  were 
concerned  by  the  growing  public  involvement  in  economic  activity,  private 
investments were likely to suffer a further decline. Currie and White believed that 
the first effect would prevail. Currie, especially, gave a prominent contribution to 
the shaping of the bold program of public expenditures approved by the Congress 
in April 1938 and attained the support of many others economists and officers, 
including White. Viner and Williams, on the contrary, thought that the ill devised 
program of expenditures and the further increase of the public debt delayed any 
self-sustaining recovery. After having joined their forces for many years within 
the Administration, Currie, Viner, White and Williams came finally to be enrolled 
in  the  two  opposite  armies  engaging  the  “struggle  for  the  soul  of  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt” (Stein 1969, Chapter 6).    
   
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Viner, Williams, Currie and White cannot be considered as members of a 
cohesive research group or a school of thought, and certainly they did not regard 
themselves  as  such.  Yet,  they  shared  a  common  set  of  methodological  and 
analytical views, which were deeply rooted in their training at Harvard during the 
1920s. They also shared a vision about what anti-depression policies the United 
States should enact, and they cooperated within the Administration to promote 
their introduction. 
During the first term of the Roosevelt administration, Viner, Williams, White 
and  Currie  focused  on  the  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  depression  and  the 
possible  ways  to  recovery.  They  soon  became  influential  actors  in  the  policy-34 
 
making process that led to New Deal reforms and stabilization policies, either in 
monetary, banking, fiscal and international matters. 
 Since  as  early  as  1932  they  urged  the  administration  and  the  Fed  to 
undertake  a  program  of  monetary  and  fiscal  expansion  and  to  strengthen  the 
banking system by means of wider rediscount eligibility for banking assets. Their 
recommendations influenced the final drafting of the Glass-Steagall Act and other 
emergency measures. In 1933-1934, Viner and Williams fiercely and successfully 
opposed Irving Fisher’s and George Warren’s program of dollar devaluation and 
drastic  increase  in  the  quantity  of  money.  They  succeeded  in  terminating  that 
policy  with  the  Gold  Stabilization  Act  of  January  1934.  In  1935,  Currie  was 
entrusted with designing the new Banking Act, which strengthened the powers of 
the  Fed,  provided  it  with  new  tools  of  monetary  control,  and  disentangled  its 
statutory objectives from the Commercial Loans principles in favor of a broad set 
of stabilization policies. Both Viner and Williams supported this reform in public 
speeches and within the Administration. In 1936 they urged the Fed to use its 
newly acquired powers to double banks’ reserves to prevent a sudden inflationary 
spike arising from gold inflows.  
In terms of fiscal policy, Viner, Currie and White supported the deliberate 
resort  to  budget  deficits  in  order  to  speed  up  recovery  and  restore  business 
confidence; these measures were grounded on a series of statistical data on the 
effects of government expenditures on income, which were suggested by Viner 
and researched by Currie and Krost. These ideas inspired the bold program of 
deficit-financed expenditures enacted by Roosevelt after the recession of 1937-
38. In addition, in 1939 Roosevelt appointed Currie as the first economic adviser 
to  the  White  House.    However,  it  must  be  noted  that,  while  Currie  and  White 
strongly supported the 1938 spending program, Viner and Williams regarded it as 
an ill-devised program that would not succeed in restoring business confidence 
and foster private investments (Nerozzi 2007, 2009a; Williams 1941, 1942).    35 
 
While  Currie  was  not  directly  involved  in  international  economic  policy 
during the 1930s, Viner, White and Williams joined forces in fostering monetary 
cooperation. They took part in the negotiations for the Tripartite agreement of 
September 1936, when, for the first time since the crisis, France, Great Britain 
and the United States committed themselves to cooperate in reintroducing more 
limited targets of exchange rates stability. In the following years, White, Viner 
and Williams played a fundamental role in the negotiations that led to the new 
international monetary order. While Viner took some part in the refinement of the 
White  Plan  and  publicly  supported  it,  Williams  proposed  a  different  approach, 
known as the Key-Currency approach, focusing on stabilization only between the 
British pound and the dollar, and allowing other countries to choose their own 
exchange rate regime. Williams’s proposal was also supported by Currie (Nerozzi 
2009b); it aroused a lively debate and was later acknowledged by Robert Mundell 
as  a  source  of  inspiration  for  his  theory  of  Optimal  Currency  Areas  (Asso  and 
Fiorito 2009).  
This  joint  policy  action  was  grounded  on  the  interpretation  that  the  four 
economists  gave  of  the  Great  Depression:  Currie,  Viner  and  Williams  believed 
that heavy deflationary forces were at work all over the world as a consequence 
of the war and the post-war settlements, and blamed the onset of the crisis on 
the ominous policies enacted by the Fed which, in an awkward attempt to curb 
speculation  and  preserve  adherence  to  the  Commercial  Loans  criteria,  had 
provoked  a  sudden  monetary  contraction  at  home  and  abroad.  This  monetary 
interpretation  anticipated  the  main  lines  of  the  Friedman’s  and  Schwartz’s 
analysis  of  the  depression  and,  together  with  the  recommendations  stemming 
from  the  1932  Chicago  Harris  Foundation  Conference,  was  credited  to  have 
played an important role in the establishment of the so-called Chicago monetary 
tradition.  Laidler  and  Sandilands  considered  the  analysis  put  forth  by  Currie, 
White,  Williams  and  Viner  the  proof  of  the  non-originality  of  the  Chicago 
Tradition. It followed the opportunity to retrace the emergence of an American, 36 
 
monetarist, stream of original macroeconomic thought at Harvard, under Young’s 
and Hawtrey’s teaching, rather than at Chicago, under Lloyd Mints’s and Henry 
Simons’s.  
Yet, a point that we would like to emphasise is that the monetary theory 
proposed by these four Harvard economists differed substantially from the views 
which were later to be associated with monetarism. Their ideas concerning the 
way money influenced aggregate demand and how the income velocity of money 
could offset changes in the money supply contrasted with Friedman’s restatement 
of  the  quantity  theory.  Moreover,  their  interpretation  of  the  deepening  of  the 
depression,  of  the  delayed  recovery,  and  of  the  recession  of  1937-38did  not 
correspond to that proposed by Friedman and Schwarz in 1963: the four Harvard 
economists  would  have  certainly  denied  that  the  dictum  “money  does  matter” 
would  apply  without  specification  to  the  U.S.  economy  during  the  1930s.  Real 
factors such as the fundamental disequilibrium between savings and investments 
underpinned the working of monetary forces and the strenuous resistance of the 
“propensity to hoard” on the part of banks, firms and individuals. Gloomy price 
and  sales  expectations,  together  with  anti-business  taxation,  determined  a 
sluggish  demand  for  credit  and  the  collapse  of  investment  expenditures.  Their 
opposition to Irving Fisher’s plans of monetary expansion and to the 100% bank 
reserves was also strengthened by their advocacy of central banks’ discretionary 
powers against the imposition of any fixed rule. Moreover, their support of deficit 
spending  was  based  not  on  the  typical  monetarist  argument  that  it  was  an 
alternative channel to the increase of the money supply, but rather as the most 
effective means to directly foster consumption and investment expenditures, and 
thus revive business confidence.   
Another  point  is  that  this  vision  had  a  clear  Keynesian  flavour  and  was, 
indeed, influenced by Keynes’s pre-1936 writings. Especially the works of Currie 
and Williams in the early 1930s showed how much, though not uncritically, the 
Harvard economists had drawn from Keynes’ Treatise on Money. Their focus on 37 
 
disequilibrium between saving and investments, and the relevance they attached 
to long-term rather than short-term interest rates in business cycles and banking 
activity clearly derived from Keynes. Their advocacy of open market purchases 
and of pump priming fiscal policy (with reference to the indirect effect of public 
works  expenditures)  echoed  Keynes’s  own  proposals,  especially  for  the  United 
States (Keynes 1931, 1933). Sandilands has not ignored Keynes’s influence on 
Currie and Currie’s specifications about what Keynes was most interesting to him. 
The debate on the originality of the Chicago monetary tradition and its alleged 
Harvard roots, however, has somewhat de-emphasized the interpretation of the 
monetary views shared by these Harvard trained economist in the early 1930s 
and afterwards. 
A final remark concerns the reception of the General Theory by this group 
of  economists.  Especially  Viner’s  and  William’s  comments,  though  not  overly 
unfavourable,  highlighted  many  shortcomings  in  Keynes’s  masterpiece.  More 
precisely,  they  highlighted  Keynes’s  too  mechanical  multiplier  analysis,  the 
excessive simplification of liquidity preference, his lack of attention to the supply 
side  and  especially  to  inflationary  problems  which  were  likely  to  arouse  in  the 
wake of full-employment policies. Williams and Viner expressed their scepticism 
to  the  Keynesian  concept  of  unemployment  equilibrium  as  a  long-term 
phenomenon, which required extensive and permanent deficit spending to attain 
full employment. It was probably for this reason that they came to side against 
the  deficit  spending  program  of  April  1938.White  and  Currie  never  seemed  to 
agree  with  Williams’s  and  Viner’s  criticism  of  Keynesian  ideas.  Despite  all 
distinctions  and divergences,  however, these four  Harvard economists  were  an 
effective  channel  through  which  pre-1936  Keynesian  theory  –  as  John  K. 
Galbraith  put  it  –  “came  to  America”  and  merged  with  a  vivid  tradition  of 
monetary  and  macroeconomic  research  that  emerged  in  the  landscape  of  New 
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